Abstract This article analyzes the impact of border measures for climate policy on carbon leakage and the competitiveness of U.S. aluminum producers. An appropriate border measure is shown to depend on competition in aluminum production, as well as the basis for assessing trade neutrality of a border measure. If neutrality is based on market volume, carbon leakage is prevented, but competitiveness cannot be maintained. If neutrality is based on market share, competitiveness can be maintained and there is negative carbon leakage. In either case, users of aluminum incur deadweight losses from the combination of climate policy and border measures. The key policy implication of the analysis is that appropriately designed border measures for climate policy may break the link between competitiveness and carbon leakage, but their design is important in ensuring that they are not protectionist.
own carbon emission reduction targets and the policy instruments for reaching those targets. The main outcome of the December 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference (UNCCC) meeting held in Paris was the commitment made by 186 countries to reduce their carbon emissions, which covers 96% of global emissions; however, it is recognized that the reality of meeting these commitments, referred to as Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), requires some significant challenges to be overcome (Farid et al. 2016) .
Much of the recent discussion as well as actual application of climate policy has focused on the use of market-based instruments such as carbon taxes and tradable emissions permits, the latter commonly being referred to as cap-and-trade. Carbon pricing policies have several advantages over regulatory instruments such as the setting of emissions standards, and they are increasingly being utilized by policymakers. For example, the European Union (EU), California, and some provinces in China have adopted emissions trading schemes, while 15 other national governments or sub-national provinces now employ carbon taxes (ibid). However, these instruments only cover a small proportion of global emissions and, when carbon taxes have been employed, they have generally been set below levels consistent with the environmental objectives.
Whether a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system is used, the expectation is that certain (particularly energy-intensive) industries that either directly or indirectly account for a large proportion of emissions will all face increased costs of production. As a consequence, much of the unilateral climate legislation that has been proposed also includes some type of border measure to be targeted at energy-intensive imports; in relation to the commitments offered at the Paris meeting of UNCCC, addressing the issue of border measures is one of the main challenges still to be addressed. The inclusion of border measures in climate change legislation is predicated on two concerns: (i) there will be carbon leakage, that is, production by energy-intensive industries will be shifted to countries with less restrictive climate policies; (ii) there will be a reduction in competitiveness of producers in industries most affected by domestic climate policies (WTO/UNEP 2009; Condon and Ignaciuk 2013) .
Researchers have analyzed how trade policy instruments might be used to prevent carbon leakage that occurs when one group of countries commits to cooperation over climate policy, while a second group free-rides by not implementing climate policy. For example, Hoel (1996) shows that a social optimum can be obtained if countries that form a coalition set common carbon taxes, and at the same time use import tariffs (export subsidies) on all energy-intensive traded goods, the objective being to shift the terms of trade against free-riding countries, thereby reducing carbon leakage. In their survey of recent quantitative modelling of domestic climate policies and carbon leakage, Condon and Ignciuk (2013) report that border measures have the potential to reduce but not eliminate the extent of leakage.
While the argument that using trade policy instruments to resolve a market failure is compelling theoretically, it has raised practical concerns that border measures such as taxes could be used for protectionist ends and would therefore be constrained by current World Trade Organization (WTO) and General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade (GATT) rules (Holmes, Reilly, and Rollo 2012) . More generally, there is uncertainty about the compatibility of border taxes and WTO/GATT rules and the associated design Climate Policy and Border Measures: The Case of the U.S. Aluminum Industry of these policies. For example, determining the carbon content of imported goods from countries where environmental policies are either nonexistent or are more lax than those applied in the importing country. In this context, the focus of the current article is on a different justification for dealing with border measures: if such trade policy instruments are treated as border tax adjustments (BTAs) rather than border taxes (subsidies), the principle for their use in the presence of a domestically imposed excise tax is well-founded in the international public finance literature on origin vs. destination-based taxation systems (Lockwood and Whalley 2010) .
Essentially this principle is captured in the WTO/GATT rules: GATT Article II: 2(a) allows members of the WTO to place on the imports of any good, a BTA equivalent to an internal tax on the like good. However, under GATT Article III: 2, the BTA cannot be applied in excess of that applied directly or indirectly to the like domestic good, that is, they have to be neutral in terms of their impact on trade, their objective being to preserve competitive equality between domestic and imported goods (WTO 1997) [emphasis added]. With respect to exported goods, WTO/GATT rules allow a rebate of the domestic tax on the exported good; as long as the border adjustment does not exceed the level of the domestic tax, it is not regarded as an export subsidy under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (GATT 1994) .
While there has been considerable discussion about the legal permissibility of BTAs for domestic climate policy, two key aspects of the legal debate remain unresolved (Pauwelyn 2007) . First, it is unclear whether a BTA will be allowed on imports of a final energy-intensive good, when the domestic carbon tax directly affects an input into its production which is not physically present in the final good. Pauwelyn (2007) argues convincingly that if the objective of a carbon tax on the upstream input, for example, electricity, is to ensure that the price domestic consumers pay for an energy-intensive product reflects the social cost of producing the final good, then a BTA on the imported final good should be permitted.
Second, it is also unclear whether WTO rules on BTAs would apply in the case where domestic climate policy consists of a cap-and-trade system. Here, Pauwelyn (2007) argues that if emission credits command a market price, then the obligation of electricity producers to hold emission credits up to the actual level of their carbon emissions qualifies as an internal tax. Assuming this internal tax is passed forward to domestic downstream producers/consumers, an appropriate BTA can be implemented on imports of final goods. In light of this discussion, the current article proceeds upon the assumption that a BTA for either a domestic carbon tax or cap-and-trade system will be considered legal.
While carbon leakage and competitiveness are closely connected in the climate policy debate, the latter is a rather more difficult concept to define and one which has been largely side-stepped in the climate literature; it is nevertheless particularly pertinent if industries that face domestic environmental taxes are imperfectly competitive, as is likely to be the case with energyintensive industries. In this context, competitiveness could be thought of in terms of market share and/or the profit of producers, which in turn are a function of the specific characteristics of an industry subject to domestic climate policy, including factors such as market structure, industry technology and the nature of competition between producers. This suggests that climate policy and BTAs are perhaps best analyzed in the context of the literature Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy on trade and environmental policy pioneered by, inter alia, Conrad (1993) . The key point of this previous literature is that if producers earn positive economic profits, implementing climate policy may have the effect of shifting profits between domestic and foreign producers, thereby affecting the former's competitiveness. This, however, gives rise to a further issue: if (energy-intensive) industries likely to be affected by environmental policies are imperfectly competitive, the extent of pass-through matters. Specifically, environmental taxes are likely to be "under-shifted", that is, the resulting price increase of an energyintensive good is less than the level of the environmental tax, which will also affect the extent to which production changes determine the impact on market share and the change in profits. In sum, the extent of pass-through will be an important determinant of the competitiveness effect and hence the consequent BTA that should be applied.
In this article, the U.S. aluminum industry is used as a specific case study, with a focus designed to address several of the key issues highlighted above. The aluminum industry is energy-intensive, with electricity being one of the main inputs in the production of aluminum. The industry is also characterized by a small number of dominant firms: indeed, the industry has repeatedly been investigated by antitrust authorities for anti-competitive behavior, and there is empirical evidence that producers in the sector do behave less than competitively (Yang 2005) . As such, the issues associated with climate policies when industries are imperfectly competitive arise here, that is, profit-shifting, market shares, and the pass-through of environmental taxes. The aluminum industry serves as a useful case study for exploring the interlinked issues of domestic climate policy, competitiveness, carbon leakage, and the appropriate setting of BTAs. 1 Specifically, this article evaluates the potential effects of climate policy on the U.S. aluminum industry, based on a simple model that can be calibrated to capture the industry's market structure and behavior. This analysis generates two key results: first, characterizing behavior in the U.S. aluminum industry as imperfectly competitive captures the link between carbon leakage and competitiveness. Importantly, the extent to which climate policy results in carbon leakage and a loss of competitiveness by U.S. aluminum producers depends on how aggressively competing Canadian aluminum producers respond to output changes by U.S. producers. Second, the results illustrate a classic regulatory problem: the difficulty of achieving several policy objectives (ensuring no carbon leakage/maintaining competitiveness) with a limited set of policy instruments (climate policy, BTAs), in a situation where there is a binding external constraint (WTO/GATT rules) on the use of one of those instruments (BTAs).
The article is organized as follows: first, key characteristics of the U.S. aluminum industry are described. Second, a model of the aluminum production sector is outlined. Third, climate policy and BTAs are discussed. Fourth, the results of simulating the effects of BTAs are presented. Finally, a summary of the article and some conclusions are presented.
The U.S. Aluminum Industry The U.S. aluminum industry has already been identified as potentially vulnerable to the issues of competitiveness and carbon leakage because it is both energy-intensive and also highly exposed to international competition (Houser et al. 2009 ). In describing the industry, production technology and market structure are briefly discussed.
Technology of Production
Aluminum production is part of a vertical process that initially requires the raw materials bauxite and alumina. Bauxite is mined in 26 countries around the world, and in 2011 83% of the world's production was provided by Australia, Brazil, China, India, and Guinea (U.S. Geological Survey 2012). Bauxite is processed into alumina, which is subsequently used to produce aluminum. Unwrought aluminum is then cast into various shapes depending on its end use: large flat ingots are intended for hot-rolling to produce aluminum plate and sheet, while cylindrical ingots are for extrusion through a die to produce tubing and other hollow shapes.
Aluminum is extracted from alumina using an electrolytic reduction method known as the Hall-Héroult process. This process takes place in a series of steel-shelled cells, or "pots", which are lined with refractory bricks and carbon blocks, alumina being dissolved in the pot using a molten electrolyte. An electrical current is passed through the electrolyte via a carbon anode hung over the pots, the latter acting as a cathode, reducing the alumina to aluminum and oxygen. The oxygen is released on the carbon anode where it forms carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide, while the aluminum settles to the bottom of the pots. This process is very energy-intensive, with anywhere from 14 to 17 megawatts of electricity required per tonne of aluminum, the amount depending on the type of anode-technology used (prebake vs. Sö derberg). Production costs for primary aluminum are dominated by raw materials (35%), electricity (25%), and anodes (16%), respectively, while the remainder stems from labor and other input costs (24%), (U.S. International Trade Commission 2010).
In terms of environmental impact, the production process has two key sources for carbon and other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions: direct carbon dioxide emissions due to anode degradation and perfluorocarbon (PFC) emissions from the electrolyte, amounting to emissions of 2-3 tCO 2 /t of aluminum produced (Carbon Trust 2011); indirect carbon emissions associated with upstream electricity production, where the amount of carbon dioxide produced depends on the method of electricity generation, ranging from 3 tCO 2 /t of aluminum for hydro-electric production to 20 tCO 2 /t of aluminum for coal-powered production (ibid).
Market Structure
The most complete data for market structure of the aluminum industry is for the year 2008. With respect to the United States, table 1 indicates that market structure is highly concentrated, with two producers, Alcoa and Century Aluminum, accounting for 73% of production capacity. Based on s being the share of production of each firm, the Herfindahl index H ¼ P s 2 ¼ 0.34, which, when calculated as a numbers-equivalent,
Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy 1/H ¼ 2.94, implies a market structure of almost 3 symmetric-sized producers. This market structure is a function of high entry barriers due to the size of investment required in production facilities, and also the extent to which merger activity over the period 2004-08 resulted in industry consolidation (U.S. International Trade Commission 2010). Despite this concentrated market structure, there is significant import competition in the U.S. market. In 2008, U.S. production of aluminum was 2.66 million tonnes, which was almost exclusively for domestic consumption. Total imports of aluminum were 2.81 million tons, of which over 71% was accounted for by Canada, the other major suppliers being Russia and Venezuela, with 10% and 4% shares of U.S. imports, respectively (U.S. International Trade Commission 2010). Canada's share of U.S. aluminum imports increased substantially after 2004, such that by 2008, Canadian exports to the United States accounted for 64% of its total production (ibid), suggesting that it is reasonable to think of the United States and Canada as a well-defined North American market, where Canadian producers essentially compete in the U.S. market. In terms of market structure in Canada, table 1 indicates that the aluminum industry there is also highly concentrated, with two producers, Rio Tinto Alcan and Alcoa, accounting for 82% of production capacity in 2008 (Natural Resources Canada 2009). The Herfindahl index is H ¼ 0.38, giving a numbers equivalent of 1/H ¼ 2.57, implying a slightly more concentrated market in Canada of 2.5 symmetric-sized producers. It should also be noted from table 1 that both the U.S. and Canadian industries are characterized by the operations of multinational producers Alcoa and Rio Tinto Alcan, which combined account for 24% of the world's aluminum production (Carbon Trust 2011). These producers operate in both the United States and Canada, although Alcoa clearly has more market share in Canada than Rio Tinto Alcan does in the United States.
A key difference between the U.S. and Canadian aluminum industries is that while the geographic location of smelting plants in both countries is tied directly to the availability and cost of electricity, the Canadian industry is located predominantly in the province of Québec, where electricity is produced entirely from hydro-electric sources (Natural Resources Canada 2009). By contrast, U.S. smelting plants are located in the southeastern region (South Carolina, Kentucky, and Virginia), the Midwest (Indiana, Missouri, and Ohio), New York, and the Pacific Northwest (Washington, and Montana), where the lion's share of electricity generation is fossil fuelbased (U.S. International Trade Commission 2010; U.S. Energy Information Administration 2012). This has important implications for carbon emissions 
A Model of the U.S. Aluminum Industry
The model of the U.S. aluminum industry presented here is a linear version of McCorriston and Sheldon (2005) that is easily calibrated to available data for the U.S. aluminum industry, and then used for policy simulation.
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The structure of the North American aluminum industry is divided into two, where subscript 1 refers to U.S. aluminum producers and subscript 2 refers to Canadian-based producers exporting to the U.S. market. It is assumed that there is no entry/exit of producers who face constant average and marginal operating costs. While it is possible for producers with plants in both the United States and Canada to switch production between the two countries, this is not modeled explicitly.
In each country, production of aluminum generates carbon emissions e via the function, e i ¼ f ðQ i Þ, where Q i is total aluminum production in countries i ¼1, 2, and emissions are the sum of direct emissions from aluminum production and indirect emissions due to upstream production of the key input electricity. Also, f 0 ðQ i Þ > 0, that is, GHG emissions (direct and indirect) increase in aluminum output, and it is possible that f 0 ðQ 1 Þ 6 ¼ f 0 ðQ 2 Þ, capturing the idea that aluminum production in the U.S. may generate more or less carbon emissions for a given level of output compared to aluminum production in Canada.
Demand
The inverse derived demand functions for aluminum are given as:
where p 1 and p 2 are U.S. and Canadian aluminum prices, respectively, all parameters are positive, and b 1 b 2 À k 2 ! 0, allowing U.S. and Canadian aluminum to be imperfect substitutes.
Producer Behavior
On the supply side, the profit functions of typical U.S. and Canadian aluminum producers are
where q i and c i are their output and costs, respectively.
2 See the supplementary online appendix for a complete outline of the model and how to calibrate it.
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If producers maximize profits with respect to output, the aggregate firstorder conditions for n 1 (n 2 ) symmetric U.S.(Canadian) producers are
where the ks measures the mark-up of price over marginal cost by U.S. and Canadian firms. With the relevant data, values for the ks can be retrieved from equations (5) and (6), and then compared to the well-known market structures of competition, k ¼ 0, and Cournot, k ¼ b=n.
Market equilibrium for the U.S. aluminum industry is derived as
where
Climate Policy and Border Tax Adjustments
Climate Policy and Leakage
Assume initially that BTAs are not available, so that the U.S. government can only target climate policy at its electricity and aluminum producers. To keep the exposition simple, the price associated with emitting carbon or any other GHGs is denoted as g e , which is based on either a carbon tax t e , or the market price of an emissions permit m e , and it is assumed that g e ¼t e ¼m e . Setting a carbon price raises U.S. aluminum producers' costs c 1 via two channels: indirectly through the price of carbon being transmitted into higher electricity prices, and directly through aluminum producers being faced with a carbon price. This increase in costs affects the output of U.S. aluminum producers, given by dQ 1 =dc 1 . The cost increase to U.S. aluminum producers also affects imports of Canadian aluminum, given by dQ 2 =dc 1 . Following Ritz's (2009) specification of carbon leakage, and assuming that U.S. electricity aluminum producers do not respond to a carbon price by reducing their intensity of carbon emissions via cleaner technology, carbon leakage l is given as
that is, even if the intensity of carbon emissions is the same in U.S. and Canadian aluminum production, f 0 ðQ 1 Þ ¼ f 0 ðQ 2 Þ, there will be positive carbon leakage, l >0, if there is positive output leakage, that is, dQ 2 = À dQ 1 > 0. Equation (7) can be used to re-write equation (8) as
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If l > 0, there is positive carbon leakage, and if l < 0, there is negative carbon leakage in the sense that carbon emissions actually decrease after the implementation of U.S. carbon pricing. Given that a U.S. carbon price has a positive effect on imports of Canadian aluminum, dQ 2 ¼ D À1 kdc 1 > 0, and a negative effect on U.S. aluminum production, dQ 1 ¼ fD À1 ðb 2 þ k 2 Þdc 1 g < 0, the direction of carbon leakage is given by f 0 ðQ 2 Þ relative to f 0 ðQ 1 Þ, and the magnitude of the output response by U.S. and Canadian aluminum producers.
Border Tax Adjustments and Neutrality
Now assume a BTA, t b , can be targeted at U.S. imports of aluminum, thereby raising the costs of Canadian producers. This is given by dQ 2 =dc 2 , which in turn affects Canadian carbon emissions e 2 , and thereby carbon leakage l. Since the WTO/GATT guidelines on BTAs are not specific in defining "competitive equality", two cases are considered where the neutral BTA is defined as either the change in c 2 that keeps the volume of imports of Canadian aluminum constant given a carbon price g e , or as the change in c 2 that keeps the U.S. market share of imports of Canadian aluminum constant given g e . It can be argued that both of these rules fit into a broader rationale on how implementation of stricter environmental standards can be accommodated in a manner that is consistent with key principles of the WTO/GATT concerning market access. In the absence of BTAs, the United States would have little incentive to unilaterally implement carbon pricing due to the competitiveness effect. However, if the competitiveness effect is thought of in terms of Canadian producers gaining additional market access to the U.S. aluminum market beyond levels previously negotiated in WTO/GATT, using a BTA to restore the level of market access to its negotiated level after implementation of the environmental standard would be unlikely to elicit a complaint to the WTO from Canada.
If neutrality is defined in terms of import volume, the appropriate BTA is given as
When markets are perfectly competitive, k 1 ¼ 0 and k ¼ b 1 , the reduction in U.S. imports of Canadian aluminum due to the BTA will exactly offset the increase in U.S. imports of Canadian aluminum due to carbon pricing, that is, jdQ 2 = dc 2 j ¼ jdQ 2 = dc 1 j, the net effect of policies being dQ 2 ¼ 0. Therefore, the appropriate BTA should be set equal to the U.S. carbon price. Specifically, with a carbon price of g e , the BTA is based on carbon embodied in the domestically produced final good, not the carbon intensity of imported aluminum.
In contrast, when markets are imperfectly competitive, k 1 > 0 and k b 1 , setting the BTA equal to the price of carbon will lead to a non-neutral outcome: dQ 2 6 ¼ 0. The BTA reduces the level of U.S. imports of Canadian aluminum, that is, dQ 2 =dc 2 ¼ D À1 ðb 1 þ k 1 Þ < 0, and U.S. carbon pricing increases the level of U.S. imports of aluminum, that is, dQ 2 =dc 1 ¼ D À1 k > 0. However, the absolute value of the own-effect of a BTA on Canadian Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy producers is greater than the cross-effect of U.S. carbon pricing on Canadian producers, that is, jdQ 2 = dc 2 j > jdQ 2 = dc 1 j. Therefore, to ensure trade neutrality, the BTA should be set less than the carbon price.
In the case of import-share neutrality, the appropriate BTA is defined as one where the net effect of the carbon price on Q 1 and Q 2 must equal the net effect of the BTA on Q 1 and Q 2 . In this case, the neutral BTA is defined as
Under perfect competition, k i ¼ 0 and k ¼ b 1 ¼ b 2 , and therefore the effect of policies is one where the net response of U.S. and Canadian aluminum producers to the carbon price is matched exactly by their net response to the BTA, that is, the numerator in equation (11) is equal to the denominator, resulting in no change in the U.S. market share of imports of Canadian aluminum, dðQ 2 =ðQ 1 þ Q 2 Þ ¼ 0. In other words, the BTA should again be set equal to the U.S. carbon price. With imperfect competition, the magnitude of the BTA relative to the U.S. carbon price depends on the extent of imperfect competition in the U.S. aluminum industry, as captured in k, and also the relative size of the own-effects to the cross-effect of policies. In particular, if the expression inside square brackets in the numerator of equation (11) is greater than the denominator, the BTA will be set above the U.S. carbon price in order to satisfy trade neutrality.
Model Calibration and Policy Simulation

Calibration
Given the theoretical structure, the demand system is calibrated for 2008, the year of most recent and complete data for the U.S. and Canadian aluminum industries, using price, quantity, and elasticity data as presented in table 2; p 1 and p 2 are based on the unit values of U.S.-produced and imported aluminum as reported by the U.S. Geological Survey (2010) and the USITC (2010), respectively, while Q 1 and Q 2 are derived from USITC (2010) data. The value of the elasticity of demand is based on an econometric estimate by Yang (2005) , and the elasticity of substitution between U.S.-produced and imported aluminum is based on an estimate reported by USITC (2004) . The values for c 1 and c 2 are based on production cost estimates for North America reported by the Carbon Trust (2011). Based on model calibration, the parameters for the inverse demand functions consistent with equilibrium in the U.S. aluminum industry in 2008 are shown in the top half 
Policy Simulation
In simulating the effects of U.S. carbon pricing and BTAs, the U.S. social welfare function is defined as
12) where the first term denotes the profits of U.S. aluminum producers, the second term is the surplus of U.S. aluminum users, the third term is the potential revenue raised from carbon pricing, the fourth term is tax revenue raised from a BTA, and the final term is the sum of the damage from carbon emissions in both countries, bearing in mind that carbon emissions are being treated as a global public "bad". The latter are evaluated based on assuming that at a discount rate of 3%, the social cost of CO 2 in 2050 released in 2008 is equal to $21/t (IWGSCC 2010).
The initial policy simulation focuses on the effect of a U.S. carbon price set at $25/t CO 2 , and borne by both U.S. electricity and aluminum producers. This carbon price is based on Tol's (2005) mean CO 2 damage estimate, and also matches up with Fowlie's (2009) analysis of carbon pricing in the Californian electricity sector. Importantly, the U.S. carbon price is assumed to be set higher than that recently introduced in Canada, that is, carbon leakage and competitiveness effects will be driven by differential carbon pricing. On January 1, 2013, Québec implemented a cap-and-trade system for carbon emission permits as part of the Western Climate Initiative (O'Brien et al. 2013) . The program covers electricity generation and industrial sectors with annual GHG emissions of over 25,000 tonnes, which includes aluminum production. From the start of the program, the distribution of emissions permits to electricity generation has been set at 100% via auction, but because of concerns about competitiveness and carbon leakage, industries such as aluminum received 80-100% of their required emissions permits free of charge until 2014, after which the number of free emissions permits they receive declines by 1-2% per year. The Québec Ministry of Sustainable Development, Environment, Wildlife and Parks (MDDEFP) held permit auctions on December 3, 2013 and March 4, 2014, and the final auction prices averaged $10.2/t CO 2 (MDDEFP 2013; 2014) . In order to evaluate the impact of carbon pricing on U.S. aluminum producers due to their indirect emissions via electricity generation, the expected change in U.S. electricity prices is calculated, based on Fowlie (2009) . Assuming the electricity industry is characterized by Cournot behavior, Fowlie (2009) forecasts that carbon pricing raises the price of electricity by $22.87/MWh, an increase of 49%, and implying pass-through of the carbon price of around 90%. Given that electricity accounts for 25% of U.S. aluminum production costs, this translates into an increase in c 1 by $220/t of aluminum produced. In terms of direct carbon emissions from U.S. aluminum production, the impact of carbon pricing is calculated to increase c 1 by $62.5/t of aluminum produced, based on emissions of 2.5 tCO 2 /t of aluminum. This implies a total increase in the costs facing U.S. aluminum producers of $282/t of aluminum produced.
The auction prices for carbon permits in Canada are borne directly by Québec electricity producers, and then passed on to Canadian aluminum producers, who as noted earlier, are almost exclusively located in Québec. Assuming the rate of pass-through of increased electricity prices is similar in Canada to the United States, Québec carbon pricing translates into an increase in Canadian aluminum production costs c 2 by $84/t of aluminum produced. The initial free allocation of emissions permits to aluminum producers in Québec means that there is no direct increase in Canadian aluminum production costs.
The results of simulating the introduction of a U.S. carbon price are reported in table 4. Column (1) reports the breakdown of social welfare preimplementation of any U.S. carbon pricing, given that Canadian carbon pricing is already in place, along with the level of carbon emissions and the market share of U.S. aluminum producers. This can then be compared to the effects of implementing differential U.S. and Canadian carbon pricing in column (2) of the table. The results indicate that the policy generates a 3.7% decline in U.S. social welfare, with the 15.5% decline in profits of U.S. aluminum producers, and the 5.3% decline in surplus of U.S. aluminum Table 4 Welfare Effects of U.S. Carbon Pricing ($ billion) Note: Elasticity of demand ¼ -0.54; elasticity of substitution ¼ 3.5; discount rate ¼ 3%.
Climate Policy and Border Measures: The Case of the U.S. Aluminum Industry users being partially offset by the tax revenue raised from carbon pricing and the reduction in the social cost of emissions. In terms of competitiveness and carbon leakage, the results indicate that U.S. aluminum producers lose market share and there is positive carbon leakage, although total North American GHG emissions do decline by 5.6%. The net deadweight loss of imposing a carbon price in the presence of imperfectly competitive behavior is also derived: gross deadweight loss is calculated as the difference between the lost surplus of U.S. aluminum users due to higher aluminum prices, and the tax revenue raised from carbon pricing, from which the reduction in the social cost of carbon emissions is deducted. The results indicate that there is net deadweight loss of -$0.14 billion, which highlights a result discussed by Conrad (1993) : in the presence of imperfect competition, there is a tradeoff between targeting a policy instrument at one market failure (a global public "bad") in the presence of a second market failure (market power). The implication is that in a second-best setting, the carbon price may have to be lower to minimize the net deadweight loss.
Sensitivity analysis is also conducted for the introduction of a U.S. carbon price, consisting of reductions in the elasticity of demand, the elasticity of substitution, and the discount rate. The latter is reduced to 2.5%, the social cost of CO 2 in 2050 that was released in 2008 increasing to $35/t (IWGSCC 2010) . The results of the sensitivity analysis are shown in table 5. Column (1) reports the breakdown of pre-policy social welfare, along with the level of carbon emissions and the market share of U.S. aluminum producers. The key changes compared to the results reported in table 4 are an increase in the initial level of user surplus of U.S. aluminum users due to a reduction in the elasticity of demand, along with higher social costs of emissions due to the reduction in the discount rate, the net effect being higher pre-policy social welfare. Again, this can be compared to the effects of implementing differential U.S. and Canadian carbon pricing in column (2) of the table. The key results to note are that there is a lower decline in U.S. social welfare of 2.6%, and a slightly lower level of carbon leakage, driven by the combination of lower elasticities of demand and substitution. However, the net deadweight losses are unaffected, as higher user surplus is offset by higher social costs of emissions.
The second policy simulation analyzes the effect of the United States implementing a carbon price in combination with a BTA set on imports of Canadian aluminum. As before, the carbon price is set at $25/t CO 2 , borne by both U.S. electricity and aluminum producers, and a $10.2/t CO 2 carbon price borne by Canadian electricity producers and passed on to aluminum producers in Québec; moreover, Canadian aluminum producers are assumed to receive free emission permits. In the case of a BTA designed to ensure that the volume of Canadian aluminum imports does not change after implementation of the carbon price, equation (10) indicates it should be set at $141/t of aluminum imported, that is, t b < g e . In the case of a BTA designed to ensure that the market share of imports does not change after implementing the carbon price, equation (11) indicates it should be set at $469/t of aluminum imported, that is, t b > g e : The results of implementing either one of these BTAs are shown in columns (3) and (4) of table 4. In the case of the volume BTA, the results indicate that compared to the United States setting a carbon price alone, the joint policy generates a lower decline in social welfare of 2.3% relative to the pre-policy benchmark. The 12.7% decline in profits and 7.2% decline in Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy the surplus of U.S. aluminum producers and users, respectively, are partially offset by the tax revenue raised from carbon pricing and the BTA, along with a reduction in the social cost of emissions. In terms of competitiveness and carbon leakage, the results indicate that U.S. aluminum producers still lose some market share, but there is no carbon leakage, that is, the competitiveness problem of U.S. implementation of a differential carbon price relative to Canada cannot be wholly resolved with a volume BTA. The results also indicate that there is a smaller net deadweight loss of -$0.09 billion due to the fact that there are now two policy instruments available. However, as the results in table 5, column (3) indicate, the sensitivity analysis for the effects of a volume BTA results in a larger net deadweight loss of -$0.11 billion, driven by lower tax revenue. The latter is almost entirely due to the effect of reducing the elasticity of substitution between U.S.-produced aluminum and imports from Canada, resulting in a lower BTA being required to maintain neutrality.
In the case of the share BTA, the results indicate that compared to the United States setting carbon prices alone, the joint policy generates a lower decline in social welfare of 1.3% relative to the pre-policy benchmark. Again, the 6.0% decline in profits and the 11.6% decline in surplus of U.S. aluminum producers and users, respectively, are partially offset by the tax revenue raised from carbon pricing and the BTA, along with a reduction in the social cost of emissions. In terms of competitiveness, the results indicate that U.S. aluminum producers no longer lose market share, a function of Canadian producers maintaining their market share. Interestingly, there is also negative carbon leakage, which follows from the combination of the U.S. carbon tax and share BTA, reducing the output of both U.S. and Canadian producers, but at the same time maintaining their pre-policy market shares. In other words, this particular policy combination actually "facilitates collusion" among U.S. and Canadian aluminum producers, generating the largest reduction in user surplus of any policy combination. Again, this highlights the second-best nature of the problem: while targeting carbon emissions reduces emissions, thereby lowering social cost, and using a BTA maintains competitiveness and prevents carbon leakage, another market failure, exertion of market power, is exacerbated along with the associated deadweight loss from oligopoly. The direction of these results is confirmed in the sensitivity analysis shown in table 5, column (4), although there is a larger increase in net deadweight loss of -$0.06 billion, and negative carbon leakage is lower due to a reduction of the elasticities of demand and substitution. The analysis presented here provides an important, overarching insight into the linkage between competitiveness and carbon leakage when industries are imperfectly competitive: depending on the definition of "competitiveness", BTAs may break the link between these two issues if appropriately designed. Moreover, the design of BTAs is also important in ensuring that they do not result in protectionism being afforded to the domestic energy-intensive industry.
Summary and Conclusions
The analysis presented in this article is motivated by the fact that proposed climate legislation often includes some type of border measure targeted at energy-intensive imports. The argument for including such measures is not only the possibility that import-competing producers will become less competitive following the unilateral implementation of domestic climate policy, but that there will be carbon leakage as market share shifts to foreign producers. In this context, the main contribution of this article is an analysis of the impact of climate policy and border measures in a setting that reasonably characterizes the industrial organization of an import-competing energy-intensive sector such as aluminum production. Once imperfect competition is allowed for in U.S. aluminum production, competitiveness can be defined in terms of profit-shifting between U.S. and Canadian producers. Importantly, the extent of carbon leakage and reduction in competitiveness are both shown to be dependent on the extent of imperfect competition in aluminum production, and hence on how producers interact with each other in the presence of policies that affect their costs of production.
Assuming that WTO/GATT rules on border tax adjustments apply in the context of carbon pricing borne by producers of a good, such as aluminum, that contributes both direct and indirect carbon emissions, the key consideration in the article is whether such adjustments will jointly resolve the issues of carbon leakage and loss of competitiveness by U.S. producers of aluminum. Importantly, if WTO/GATT rules on border tax adjustments are based on maintaining the volume of aluminum imports, there will be no carbon leakage, but U.S. producers incur both a reduction in output and profits, and hence a loss of competitiveness. Alternatively, if WTO/GATT rules on border tax adjustments are interpreted in terms of maintaining the U.S. market share of aluminum imports, global carbon emissions are actually reduced due to the presence of negative carbon leakage, and the competitiveness of U.S. producers is maintained.
It should also be noted that in both interpretations of WTO/GATT rules on border tax adjustments, users of aluminum actually suffer a deadweight loss due to the aggregate output of aluminum being reduced in an Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy imperfectly competitive setting. This highlights an important practical tension between targeting an environmental market failure in the presence of a second market failure, that is, market power. This tension is greatest in the case of a BTA based on maintaining the U.S. market share of imports, given that the BTA has to be set much higher than the U.S. carbon price in order to maintain the competitiveness of U.S. aluminum producers.
However, even if domestic political economy concerns favor the market share over the market volume interpretation of WTO/GATT rules, the former would seem much more likely to fall foul of the national treatment principle contained in Article III of GATT. Specifically, even if trade neutrality is maintained, Canadian exporters of aluminum might contest that they are being discriminated against via a BTA that is higher than the effective carbon price faced by U.S. aluminum producers.
In summary, and reinforcing the comments made at the outset concerning the challenges to be overcome if carbon mitigation commitments are to be realized, the design of border tax adjustments will be crucial in addressing the competitiveness and carbon leakage implications of domestic climate policy actions and where these issues are potentially more complex in industries characterized by imperfect competition, which is likely to be the case with energy-intensive industries such as aluminum, as was explored in this article.
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